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COOPER V. COMMISSIONER:
GIVE THE INVENTOR A (LEARNED) HAND
Rebecca R. Dulik*
ABSTRACT
Among the Internal Revenue Code’s many rules are some taxpayer-friendly 
provisions that grant tax benefits.  Section 1235 is one such provision, providing to 
an inventor preferential tax treatment for income from the sale or exchange of a 
patent.  In Cooper v. Commissioner, although the taxpayer inventor satisfied § 
1235’s requirements, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to deny the 
taxpayer § 1235’s benefits.  This Note compares Cooper to other § 1235 cases and 
argues that Cooper was decided wrongly because of the application of the substance 
over form doctrine.  The substance over form doctrine is overapplied in general and, 
in light of the Code’s decades of development, may no longer be necessary.  
Additionally, because taxpayers require clarity in order to arrange their affairs, 
Congress should clarify the Code’s new internal inconsistency regarding the 
treatment of income from the sale or exchange of patents resulting from the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is 
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even
a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
- Judge Learned Hand1
The Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) is a vast collection of rules written by 
Congress.2 It also contains legitimate methods for taxpayers to reduce, defer, or 
avoid certain types of taxes.  As Judge Learned Hand famously said in 1935, a 
taxpayer who takes advantage of those Code provisions is not unpatriotic.3 Indeed,
taxpayer-friendly rules are meant for taxpayers. 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS,” “Service”) may disagree with a taxpayer’s 
                                                                                                     
*. J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author thanks Professor Jeffrey 
A. Maine for his enthusiasm about the world of tax law and for his support.
1. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), rev'g 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), aff'd, 293 
U.S. 465 (1935).
2. See Title 26 of the United States Code. Congress’s power to tax originates in the “tax clause” of 
Article 1 of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.  For a history of taxation in the 
United States and the Sixteenth Amendment, see generally Joseph R. Fishkin et al., The Sixteenth 
Amendment, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-xvi [https://perma.cc/VV47-SRVX]. Congress in turn gave the 
IRS the power to promulgate regulations interpreting the Code. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).  Those 
regulations are entitled to Chevron deference. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011).  This Note does not implicate Chevron deference which applies to 
regulations; rather, it discusses litigation techniques employed by the IRS.
3. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 810.
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use of Code provisions, however.  Multiple judicially-created tax-abuse doctrines 
allow the Service to cry foul on a taxpayer’s tax arrangements.4 While it is important 
for the government to be able to collect taxes owed, these doctrines can give the 
government an unfair advantage over taxpayers. 
In Cooper v. Commissioner,5 a taxpayer arranged his affairs to take advantage 
of a Code provision offering preferential tax treatment.  Using the substance over 
form doctrine, the Service argued that, despite the taxpayer following § 1235’s 
requirements, he should be denied § 1235’s benefits.  The Tax Court and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed.6
Taxpayers in cases similar to Cooper’s won their cases.  This Note argues that 
the key difference between Cooper and those cases was the application of the 
substance over form doctrine.  This Note first offers some background in Part II on 
the tax treatment of ordinary and capital gains income, § 1235’s history and 
requirements, and the substance over form doctrine. It also touches on the 2017 Tax 
Bill (“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”) and its implications for § 1235 moving forward.  Part 
III briefly explores recent cases involving the substance over form doctrine and the 
two § 1235 cases referenced in Cooper, along with the facts of Cooper and the 
reasoning behind the majority and dissenting opinions.  Part IV argues that Cooper
was decided wrongly because the substance over form doctrine was erroneously 
applied, and that the doctrine should be applied more narrowly in the future, if at all.  
As Congress has continued to develop the Code since the inception of the substance 
over form doctrine, perhaps it is time to reevaluate the need for the doctrine.  This 
Note’s conclusion asserts that taxpayers would benefit from more consistency and 
clarity so that they can adequately plan their affairs, and that, for the purposes of § 
1235, that clarity is already found in the Code.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Income Taxation: Ordinary vs. Capital
The American system of taxation is based on income.  Though some exceptions 
apply, a taxpayer is generally taxed when she realizes an “undeniable accession to 
wealth.”7 The taxable income is then characterized as either ordinary or capital.  This 
distinction is at the heart of much litigation and this Note.  Taxpayers generally prefer 
capital gains as they are taxed at preferential rates.8 If the Code offers capital gain 
                                                                                                     
4. These include the economic substance, sham, business purpose, and step transaction doctrines. 
See generally Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 
(1982).   
5. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2017).
6. Tax disputes may be brought in a United States District Court, the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, or the Tax Court. An appealed decision of the Tax Court is heard by the appeals courts 
of the taxpayer’s home state.  Here, Cooper is a resident of California and thus, his appeal went to the 
Ninth Circuit. 
7. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see also I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
8. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012) (reflecting 2017’s top rate of 39.6%).  As of 2018, ordinary income is 
taxed at a top rate of 37%; capital gains are generally taxed at 0%, 15%, or 20% depending on the 
taxpayer’s ordinary income. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392 (2018).
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treatment for otherwise ordinary income, taxpayers and their tax attorneys may 
structure transactions to satisfy the Code’s requirements.9
Ordinary income includes income from wages, compensation for services, rents 
received, and business income whereas capital gains result from income from the 
sale or exchange of capital assets.  Section 1221 of the Code defines capital assets as 
“property held by the taxpayer” but excludes property used in business (e.g. 
inventory, supplies, accounts receivable, property subject to depreciation) and self-
created works.10 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act recently amended the self-created 
works exception to specifically include patents.11 Section 1221 currently denies 
capital asset designation to “a patent, invention, model or design (whether or not 
patented), a secret formula or process, a copyright, a literary, musical,12 or artistic 
composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property” if the aforementioned 
item is held by “a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property.”13
In order to have a capital gain under general characterization principles, a 
taxpayer must have made an investment in the capital asset.  Even though hard work 
is an investment of time and energy, hard work is not an investment in the eyes of 
the tax world.  In other words, a taxpayer may not benefit from capital gains tax 
treatment for income resulting from her time and energy.14 Therefore, income 
generated from self-made goods and services is generally treated as ordinary.15
Section 1235 offers an exception to this rule for income from the sale or exchange 
of a patent. 
B. Section 1235
Before discussing the mechanics of § 1235, it is worth taking a detour to Capitol 
Hill to explore the provision’s history, including implications for its future generated 
                                                                                                     
9. Taxpayers are generally stuck with their choices, however.  “[W]hile a taxpayer is free to 
organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax 
consequences of his choice . . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen 
to follow but did not.” Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974).
10. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2012).
11. H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, D(12) (2017) (discussing § 3311 of the House Bill).
12. There is not enough room in this Note to discuss the bizarre treatment of musical compositions.  
“At the election of the taxpayer, paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a) shall not apply to musical 
compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in subsection 
(a)(3).” I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2012).
13. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2018).  Section 1221(a)(3)(B) provides that “in the case of a 
letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced.”  
Section 1221(a)(3)(C) disallows capital asset designation if the item is held by the non-creator but the 
basis is the same in their hands.
14. Although an inventor may monetarily invest in her invention, that investment does not create 
the kind of investment necessary to achieve capital asset status.  The Code may allow deductions under 
other provisions for these costs. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 183, 212 (2012). 
15. Congress’s intention to disallow capital gain treatment for self-created works is evidenced by 
its addition of § 1221(a)(3)’s denial of capital asset designation to artistic or literary creations after 
Dwight D. Eisenhower claimed capital gains for income from selling the rights to his book. See Calvin 
H. Johnson, Jeffrey H. Kahn & Douglas A. Kahn, Debate on Carried Interest, TAX NOTES, 1597, 1599 
(Dec. 11, 2017).
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by the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 
1.  History of § 1235 and Its Treatment in the 2017 Tax Bill
Although patents are self-created goods, they were not always excluded from 
the capital assets definition.  In addition, for over half a century, § 1235 specifically 
allowed (and still allows) capital gain treatment for income from the sale or exchange 
of a patent.  These two Code provisions worked together—§ 1221 implicitly defining 
patents as capital assets and § 1235 explicitly offering capital gains treatment on 
income from the sale or exchange of patents—to create a clear message that patents 
were an exception to the self-created goods rule and entitled to preferential tax 
treatment. 
Before § 1235, income from the sale or exchange of a patent was only available 
to taxpayers whose transactions satisfied general capital asset requirements.  To 
succeed, the patent had to be a capital asset.  The IRS had considered patents of 
professional inventors inventory and therefore not eligible for capital asset status.16
When an amateur inventor sold his patent, even having satisfied all of the capital
asset requirements, the IRS only allowed capital asset treatment for lump sum 
payments.17 Capital gain treatment originated from the realization that some income 
is “produced over a period of years but realized in a single tax year.”18 Capital gains 
rates lessen the taxpayer’s burden in those situations.19 Because royalty payments 
look like rent, the IRS treated them as ordinary income.20 The Tax Court first granted 
capital gain treatment to an amateur inventor in 1946 for royalty payments from the 
sale of a patent; the Commissioner did not acquiesce.21
Responding to the Service’s treatment of royalty payments, Congress added § 
1235 in 1954.22 Patent sales situations are “so much like rental payments in the 
commonplace transactions involving other capital assets that Congress found it 
necessary to declare specifically that such transfers are entitled to capital gain 
treatment irrespective of the mode of payment.”23 As an “incentive to inventors to 
contribute to the welfare of the Nation,” Congress applied § 1235 equally to amateur 
and professional inventors.24 Section 1235 codified the sale or exchange requirement 
and additionally supplied the holding period required for a capital gain.25
Congress recently muddied the status of patents as an exception to the self-
created goods rule.  When the houses of Congress drafted their versions of the 2017 
Tax Bill, the House proposed two changes involving patents.  The House first 
                                                                                                     
16. See Fawick v. Comm’r, 436 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1971).
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. This thought process can be illustrated in the real estate context: whereas the sale of land results 
in capital gain because land is a capital asset, income from rent collected on renting that same land is 
treated as ordinary income.
21. Fawick, 436 F.2d at 660.
22. See id. at 659; see also S. Rep. No. 1622 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621.
23. See Fawick, 436 F.2d at 659. 
24. S. Rep. No. 1622 at 5082.
25. Id. at 5082-83.
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proposed to add patents to the capital asset exclusions of § 1221 and second, to 
eliminate § 1235 altogether.26 The Senate was silent on these two provisions.  The 
final tax bill adopted the first change to § 1221 but failed to eliminate § 1235.27 Had 
both of the House’s suggestions been adopted, income from the sale of self-created 
patents would not be entitled to capital gains and this Note would be moot.  What 
resulted instead is an internal inconsistency leaving confusion in its wake.  “Thus, § 
1221(a)(3) effectively provides that gain realized on the sale of a patent by its creator 
. . . is ordinary gain. At the same time . . . , § 1235 provides that such gain is long-
term capital gain, so long as the seller sells all substantial rights to the patent.  Both 
cannot be true.”28 Whether the inconsistency was an oversight29 or intentional, there
is a now a cloud of uncertainty hanging over inventors. 
Despite this apparent contradiction and the uncertainty of congressional intent, 
preferential rate treatment may still be available for inventor taxpayers under § 1235 
even if § 1221 would deny it.
2.  Requirements of § 1235
There are, of course, requirements to receive the benefits of § 1235.  Capital 
gain treatment is available to “a holder” of a patent when “all substantial rights” are 
“transfer[red].”30 A “holder” of a patent can be the creator herself or “any other 
individual who has acquired his interest in such property in exchange for 
consideration” before the invention was reduced to practice, so long as that 
individual is not the creator’s employer or related to the creator.31
To address Congress’s concern about inventors controlling a holding 
corporation to which they transferred their patents, it specifically included a control 
element in § 1235.  Section 1235(c) excludes a transfer of a patent to a “related 
person.”32 A “related person” for § 1235 purposes is either a family member or a 
corporation.33 Related family persons include only “spouse[s], ancestors, and lineal 
descendants.”34 The Treasury Regulations state that a related person “does not 
                                                                                                     
26. H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, D(12)-(13) (2017) (discussing §§ 3311, 3312 of the House Bill).
27. Id.
28. Deborah A. Geier, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: §§ 1221(a)(3)/1235 Disconnect, THE SURLY 
SUBGROUP (January 23, 2018), https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/01/23/ [https://perma.cc/K7WV-JJW8].  
Other elements of § 1235 must be met to satisfy its requirements. See infra Section II.B.2 for full 
explanation of requirements. 
29. After all, it was a quick process. See Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill
Passes Senate in 51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html [https://perma.cc/7XMH-
89FF] (“Republicans in Congress moved with remarkable speed in their bid to enact the biggest tax 
overhaul since 1986, unveiling legislation to rewrite the tax code, marshaling support for their effort and 
devising a compromise between the House and Senate in under two months.”). 
30. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2012).  Section 1235 excludes transfers by gift, inheritance, or devise. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1235-1(a) (as amended in 1980).
31. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1)-(2).
32. Id. § 1235(c). 
33. Id. § 1235(c)(1)-(2).  Section 1235(c) cross references to § 267(b) and § 707(b) with slight 
differences.  Notably, a related family person is less restrictive under § 1235. 
34. Id. § 1235(c)(2).
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include a brother or sister.”35
A corporation is a related person if the holder owns “25 percent or more” of the 
entity.36 This percentage was lowered from 50% in 1958.37 Congress thought that 
lowering the percentage to 25 would “prevent possible abuses arising . . . within 
essentially the same economic group.”38 Therefore, an inventor is not precluded 
from enjoying § 1235’s benefits if she owns less than 25% of the transferee holding 
corporation and her sister owns the rest.39
Despite the clear line drawn by Congress in § 1235’s control requirement, the 
IRS has argued that some inventors have too close of a relationship with their 
transferee(s) to comfortably satisfy § 1235.40 Congress responded to its concern 
about an inventor’s ability to control a transferee holding corporation with § 1235(c), 
however, and § 1235(c) does not impose a control test based on the strength of the 
inventor’s relationships.
Lastly, a “key consideration” for whether § 1235 is satisfied is the transfer of 
“all substantial rights.”41 If less than all substantial rights are transferred, then any 
income to the transferor will likely be treated as ordinary.42 An inventor must 
transfer “all rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the 
time the rights to the patent . . . are transferred.”43 The regulations offer guidance 
about what it means to retain substantial rights, including limiting the scope of the 
transfer by geography, field of use, or for a period of time less than the patent’s 
remaining life.44 While the regulations do state that retaining the right to terminate 
the agreement is a substantial right,45 the regulations do not focus on control under 
the “all substantial rights” element.
C.  Substance over Form Doctrine
Even if a taxpayer follows the Code’s requirements, the Service may 
recharacterize a taxpayer’s income.  The substance over form doctrine has its judicial 
                                                                                                     
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(f)(1).
36. I.R.C. § 1235(c)(1); see also Garfield v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 496 (T.C. 2006), aff'd, 290 
F. App'x 392 (2d Cir. 2008).
37. Lee v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1969); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-
2(f)(3).
38. Lee, 302 F. Supp. at 950 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4423).
39. This arrangement “is not considered as transferring such rights to a related person since the 
[sister] relationship is to be disregarded for purposes of section 1235.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(f)(3).
40. See infra Section III.B.
41. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing I.R.C. § 1235(a)).
42. See, e.g., Spireas v. Comm’r, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at *21 (2016).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b); see also Spireas, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at *23 (citing E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1970)) (The inquiry is “whether [the 
taxpayer] has retained rights that, in the aggregate, have substantial value.”).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i)-(iii); see, e.g., Estate of Klein v. Comm’r, 507 F.2d 617, 620 
(7th Cir. 1974); Kueneman v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 609, 619 (1977); Spireas, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at 
*23-24.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(4); Eickmeyer v. Comm’r, 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).
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roots in Gregory v. Helvering,46 a 1935 Supreme Court case, though its concept dates 
back to at least the 1920s.47 In Gregory, a taxpayer satisfied the literal elements of 
a reorganization Code provision when she created a new corporation to which she 
transferred assets tax-free from her existing corporation, and then subsequently 
dissolved the new corporation, thereby distributing those assets to her.48 The short-
lived corporation had no other business purpose.49 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the taxpayer had satisfied the elements of the provision, but asked 
“whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute 
intended.”50
Although the Board of Tax Appeals found for Gregory because “[a] statute so 
meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy, 
and leaves the small interstices for judicial consideration,” 51 the Supreme Court 
disagreed.52 Because it viewed Gregory’s use of the Code provision as “elaborate 
and devious” and outside of its congressionally-intended purpose, the Court denied 
her its benefits, declaring that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above 
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.”53
The Gregory decision helped create “a welter of rules and extrastatutory 
standards” that courts apply to tax cases.54 Outside of substance over form cases, the 
Supreme Court has typically applied statutory language rather than judicially-created 
doctrines.55 Lower courts followed the Supreme Court’s non-textualist lead in tax 
cases.56 The substance over form doctrine and its fellow anti-abuse doctrines are 
confusing, often applied in combination,57 and applied inconsistently,58 but have 
                                                                                                     
46. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
47. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance Over Form: The Cornerstone of Our Tax System or 
a Lethal Weapon in the IRS’s Arsenal? 8 AKRON TAX J. 91, 91 (1991).
48. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.  The series of transactions resulted in the taxpayer receiving capital 
gain treatment. 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 469.
51. Gregory v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932), rev’d sub nom. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 
809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
52. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
53. Id.
54. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 863; see also Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the 
Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 HOW. L.J. 693, 695 (1978) (The substance over form 
doctrine and other anti-abuse doctrines are part of “presuppositions or criteria [that] are so pervasive 
that, in combination, they resemble a preamble to the Code, describing the framework within which all 
statutory provisions are to function.”).
55. See Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-Form Doctrines 
in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 739-43 (2003). 
56. See generally Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by 
Trial Courts, 1993-2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35 (2009).  For a discussion 
of how often the Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to comment on the efficacy of the 
substance over form doctrine, see Madison, supra note 55, at 739, 739 n.305.
57. Bittker, supra note 54, at 707.
58. See Madison, supra note 55, at 722 (“The various courts of appeals have not agreed on which 
substance-over-form doctrines apply, how the doctrines apply, or when the doctrines apply.”).  For a 
discussion of court decisions, see id. at 722-38. 
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become commonplace.59
Additionally, tax-abuse doctrines are typically employed by the government 
against taxpayers.60 While a taxpayer is generally stuck with the form she chooses, 
the government has the opportunity to convince a court that it should be allowed to 
recharacterize the taxpayer’s transaction.61 Ultimately, a court that engages in a 
substance over form analysis may not approach the case neutrally; the doctrine may 
serve as the conclusion.62 Had Gregory been decided differently, it would be “hard 
to imagine that any judge would feel licensed to follow a pure gut response in 
deciding a tax dispute.”63
The doctrine has its critics and has become a topic of debate in recent court 
decisions.64 Rather than “sav[ing] the world from manipulative taxpayers,” the 
application of the substance over form doctrine unnecessarily complicates tax law.65
Because Congress has the ability to amend the Code in response to unfavorable court 
decisions that result from its statute writing, “[t]he sort of ‘creative’ jurisprudence 
found in the cases on form and substance cannot, in the end, be justified by any 
demonstrable needs of sound tax administration.”66 In other words, it is Congress’s 
job to define the nature of Code provisions and draft requirements that clearly reflect 
that nature.  Congress does not benefit from “judicial attempts to make the law 
‘better’” in individuals’ tax cases.67 Indeed, hardly anyone does.68
III. THE CASES
This section highlights some recent substance over form decisions, the two § 
1235 cases relied on in the Cooper arguments, and the Cooper decision itself.
                                                                                                     
59. See, e.g., In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “courts 
should not elevate form over substance by rewarding taxpayers who have engaged in transactions that 
lack any purpose save that of tax savings.”); Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 
1971) (denying taxpayers’ transaction preferential tax treatment when “such a result would completely 
thwart the Congressional policy to tax transactional realities.”); Tracinda Corp. v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. 
315, 326 (1998) (As a general rule, the Tax Court employs the substance over form doctrine when “the 
substance of the transaction differs from its form,” but “[i]f substance follows form then [it] will respect 
the form chosen by the taxpayer.”).
60. See Schneider, supra note 56, at 39.
61. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) (“A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization 
for his affairs as he may choose and having elected to do some business as a corporation, he must accept 
the tax disadvantages.”).
62. See Philip Sancilio, Clarifying (Or Is It Codifying) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions, 
Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 142 (2013); Knight & Knight, supra 
note 47, at 106.
63. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 882. 
64. See infra Section III.A.
65. See Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 879; see also Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” 
Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 595 (2014) (referring to the substance over 
form doctrine as “amorphous.”). 
66. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 881.
67. Id.
68. Tax lawyers, of course, benefit from the added confusion. See id. at 883 (“The heavier the 
layers of judicial divination superimposed on the Internal Revenue Code, the richer tax lawyers are apt 
to get.”). 
192 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
 
A. Recent Substance over Form Decisions
1.  Summa Holdings & Benenson
In Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax 
Court’s denial of relief to taxpayers who utilized complex Code provisions to lower 
their taxes.69 The purpose of the provisions at issue in Summa is, like many of the 
Code’s provisions, to lower taxes.70 Up front, the Sixth Circuit criticized the 
Commissioner’s reliance on the substance over form doctrine:
Each word of the “substance-over-form doctrine,” at least as the Commissioner has 
used it here, should give pause.  If the government can undo transactions that the 
terms of the Code expressly authorize, it’s fair to ask what the point of making these 
terms accessible to the taxpayer and binding on the tax collector is. “Form” is
“substance” when it comes to law.  The words of law (its form) determine content
(its substance).  How odd, then, to permit the tax collector to reverse the sequence—
to allow him to determine the substance of a law and to make it govern “over” the 
written form of the law—and to call it a “doctrine” no less.71
All parties in Summa Holdings acknowledged and agreed that the taxpayers 
followed the Code.72 “If this case dealt with any other title of the United States Code, 
we would stop there, end the suspense, and rule for [the taxpayers].”73 But, the Sixth 
Circuit continued, “when it comes to the Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner 
claims a right to reclassify Code-compliant transactions under the ‘substance-over-
form’ doctrine in order to respect ‘overarching . . . principles of federal taxation.’”74
The Sixth Circuit drew a crucial distinction in the doctrine between reclassifying 
transactions to reflect a taxpayer’s economic reality and reclassifying transactions in 
such a way that the statute is recharacterized.75 To be sure, the court acknowledged 
the need for the substance over form doctrine when it comes to squirrely taxpayer 
behavior like calling income something other than income to avoid paying taxes.76
However, the Sixth Circuit cautioned that the Code is the law and if the Service 
disagrees with the result when the Code is followed,77 the Service cannot unilaterally 
change the law; that is Congress’s job.78
                                                                                                     
69. Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2017).  The taxpayer utilized a 
DISC to increase Roth IRA accounts past individual contribution limits.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 784.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Brief of Comm’r-Appellee at 39, 41, Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 
779 (6th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1712), 2017 WL 4944289). 
75. See id. at 785.
76. Id.
77. This sentiment assumes that the taxpayer followed the Code legitimately, not a “labeling-game 
sham or defied economic reality.” Id. at 786.
78. See id. at 790.  The Sixth Circuit mused that “[p]erhaps the Commissioner’s approach made 
some sense decades ago, when the Code was simpler, and before Congress decided to pursue a wide 
range of policy goals through a complicated set of tax credits, deductions, and savings accounts.” Id. at 
789.
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The First Circuit decided Benenson v. Commissioner in April of 2018.  The facts 
are similar to those in Summa Holdings but the parties are different.  The First 
Circuit, therefore, made its own decision based on an “independent determination of 
the issues.”79 Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit reversed the Tax Court and 
held for the taxpayer, concluding that “the transaction [did] not violate the plain 
intent of the relevant statutes.”80
The First Circuit defined its approach to the substance over form doctrine in 
Benenson as a tool of statutory interpretation.81 The Code is a collection of statutes, 
and the doctrine “helps courts read tax statutes in a way that makes their technical 
language conform more precisely with Congressional intent.”82 The First Circuit, 
therefore, began its analysis by looking at the Code provisions implicated.83 From 
there, the court concluded that the taxpayers did something that the Code allows, and 
that if what the taxpayers did is not in line with what Congress intended, then it is up 
to Congress to fix it, not the courts.84
2.  Mazzei
After the Sixth Circuit decided Summa Holdings, and just before the First Circuit 
decided Benenson, the Tax Court decided Mazzei v. Commissioner.85 The Service 
argued the substance over form doctrine and the Tax Court agreed.86 The majority 
discussed the Sixth Circuit’s Summa Holdings opinion but said that its holding did 
not apply in Mazzei’s case because Mazzei merely labeled his transaction something 
that it was not, and therefore, the IRS was within its rights to argue substance over 
form.87
The dissent disagreed.  Judge Holmes considered the facts of Mazzei to be 
“nearly identical” to the facts in Summa Holdings, and argued that in light of the 
Sixth Circuit’s reversal of Summa Holdings, the Tax Court should have reconsidered 
its analysis.88 The dissent called out the approach used by the majority—“perhaps 
more common in tax law than in any other legal specialty”—as wrong because it 
“abandon[s] general principles of statutory construction in favor of using judge-made 
doctrines that undermine or ignore the text of the Code to recast transactions to avoid 
                                                                                                     
79. Benenson v. Comm’r, 887 F.3d 511, 516 (1st Cir. 2018).
80. Id. at 523.
81. Because “[t]he federal tax system is, and always has been, based on statute[,]” the First Circuit 
opined that the substance over form doctrine, as a common law tax doctrine, “can thus perhaps best be 
thought of as a tool of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 517 (quoting Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. 
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (quotation marks removed).
82. Id. (quoting Dewees v. Comm’r, 870 F.2d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 1989)) (quotation marks removed).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 523.  Reasonable minds can differ, of course.  The dissent would have affirmed because 
“Congress ha[d] never blessed such an arrangement” as the taxpayers engaged in “and the transaction . . 
. flout[ed] Congress's intent to limit Roth IRA contributions.” Id. at 523 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
85. Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. No. 7 (2018).
86. See id. at 55-56.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 63 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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‘abuse.’”89
The dissent agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the substance over form doctrine 
is correctly applied in situations where taxpayers attempt to get beneficial tax 
treatment by deviously calling something something that it is not, but did not think 
that the facts of Mazzei suggested devious actions.90 While agreeing that a dog-
owner cannot benefit from a statute offering subsidies for cow-owners simply by 
calling his dog a cow, Judge Holmes asserted that “rich people buying cows they 
don’t otherwise need in order to get the cow subsidies isn’t the same thing.”91
B. Section 1235 Cases
As previously discussed, if a taxpayer inventor retains substantial rights over a 
patent or transfers substantial rights to a related party, then he has not given away 
the patent and will be denied § 1235 benefits.92 The question presented is whether a 
taxpayer, despite satisfying the provision’s elements, including its control 
requirement, may be denied § 1235’s preferential tax benefits if the government 
argues that he controls the transferee corporation.  There are only a handful of § 1235 
cases that discuss control under the “all substantial rights” element.93 While the 
taxpayer in Cooper lost his case, the taxpayers in both Charlson v. United States and 
Lee v. United States were granted capital gains treatment under § 1235 despite 
similar issues of control. 
1.  Charlson v. United States
In Charlson, the Court of Claims was primarily concerned with whether 
Charlson effectively controlled the corporation to which he sold his patents when the 
corporation was composed of four of his friends and business associates, including 
his personal attorney, and the sole reason for the corporation’s creation was to 
purchase the taxpayer’s patents.94 Although the four individuals had “diverse 
business talents,” when the corporation decided to sell the patents a few years later, 
one of the primary reasons was because “[t]he patents had proved to be of great value 
and their successful exploitation was beyond [the corporation]’s fairly amateur 
capabilities.”95 Charlson was not a shareholder, but he advised the corporation, was 
“of aid” to his friends, and “explain[ed] the technical difficulties and advantages of 
[his inventions] to the prospective licensees.”96
The Commissioner argued that Charlson’s royalty payments were ordinary 
                                                                                                     
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id. at 82.
91. Id.
92. See supra Section II.B.2.
93. Perhaps this is because of § 1235’s separate control requirement.
94. Charlson v. United States, 525 F.2d 1046, 1048 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
95. Id. at 1049, 1051.
96. Id.
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income because his friends’ corporation was either a sham corporation97 and/or it 
was controlled by Charlson.98 Charlson, on the other hand, argued that the 
corporation “conducted its own business to advance its own interests without outside 
intervention or interference.”99
While the court determined that it was possible for a taxpayer to control a 
transferee corporation despite satisfying § 1235(c)’s specific control requirement, it 
held that Charlson did not control his friends’ corporation.100 The Court of Claims 
acknowledged that “it [was] . . . apparent that the choice of shareholders was greatly 
influenced by Mr. Charlson’s friendship . . . [and] that they would be less likely to 
do things adverse to his interests than a large unknown company would.”101
Everyone involved in the corporation, including the shareholders, benefited 
from the “mutual advantage” of Charlson’s involvement in the corporation.102
Although his relationships with these four individuals “existed for many years” and 
“[t]hese circumstances ma[d]e more probable, whether pursuant to some mutual 
understanding or not, the existence of retained control,” the court ultimately decided 
that “this probability [fell] far short of proof.”103
2.  Lee v. United States
The facts of Lee involve two coworkers on the night shift who designed a tool 
together.104 One of the men continued working at his job, the other, Lee, left to 
pursue the invention’s business as a sole proprietorship.105 The business was 
lucrative and Lee decided to incorporate to protect the business and sought to do so 
under § 1235 to reap its benefits.106 Lee transferred the patent to a new corporation 
composed of himself (24%) and his old coworker (76%).107 Lee was president of the 
new corporation and on the board of directors.108
The government argued that Lee had not transferred “all substantial rights” 
because he was in control of the new corporation.109 The court interpreted the 
government’s argument as suggesting that any transfer to a closed corporation would 
destroy § 1235 treatment, but congressional intent does not support that position.110
The court ultimately held that even though the men knew each other well over many 
                                                                                                     
97. The sham doctrine is one of the anti-abuse doctrines often intermingled with substance over 
form.  The government’s “sham corporation” argument in Charlson is beyond the scope of this Note.  
The court did not agree with it anyhow. Id. at 1057.
98. Id. at 1052.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1055.
101. Id. at 1054-55.
102. Id. at 1055.  An inventor’s expertise likely helps maintain and increase share value. 
103. Id. at 1054.
104. Lee v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 945, 946 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
105. Id. at 947.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 948.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 950.
110. See id.
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years, Lee complied with the statute and “[t]here was no evidence presented which 
suggested Lee was otherwise [aside from his 24% vote] able to force the other 
stockholders or directors to do his bidding.”111
C.  Cooper v. Commissioner
1.  Facts and Procedural History
Cooper is an inventor.112 He had an arrangement with a licensing company 
whereby he legitimately received capital gain treatment on royalties received from 
his patents, but the relationship went sour with a money dispute and subsequent 
litigation.113 Cooper thus had to find another equally beneficial home for his patents.  
He sought an attorney’s advice before he, his wife, his wife’s sister (Walters), and a 
friend (Coulter) incorporated a new company with the purpose of purchasing and 
exploiting Cooper’s patents.114 Cooper and his wife owned only 24% of the stock to 
stay within § 1235’s requirements.115 The Commissioner determined that Cooper’s 
royalties were ordinary income because he effectively controlled the corporation.116
The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit agreed.117
Because Walters and Coulter were the majority shareholders and directors of the 
corporation, the Tax Court analyzed their roles and actions in determining whether 
Cooper retained control of the corporation.118 The Tax Court took into account the 
directors’ lack of “patent, engineering, or other such skills” in its decision that they 
were not “particularly valuable” while relegating to a footnote the women’s degrees 
in finance and economics, and accomplishments in professional fields, including 
Coulter’s ownership of a company.119
The Tax Court gave weight to Cooper’s previous failed business relationship as 
evidence that he chose shareholder directors whom he knew and purportedly could 
control.120 Coulter and Walters testified that they relied on the expertise of Cooper,
as well as the corporation’s attorneys and accountants.121 After determining that 
Coulter and Walters did not act on their own, the Tax Court concluded that Cooper 
effectively controlled them and the corporation.122
                                                                                                     
111. Id.
112. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2017).
113. Id. at 1088-89.
114. Id. at 1089.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1091.
118. See Cooper v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 194, 201-02 (2014).
119. Id. at 198 n.10, 211.  There is no requirement in the Code that a transferee corporation’s 
directors have previous knowledge of patents.  There is no requirement in the Code that a transferee 
corporation’s directors be men.
120. Id. at 211.
121. Id. at 212.  Again, there is no requirement in the Code that a transferee corporation’s directors 
have previous knowledge of how best to run a patent corporation.  To say otherwise would discourage 
newcomers to the endeavor. 
122. Id. at 213. 
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2.  The Opinions
a.  Majority
Early in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit invoked the substance over form doctrine 
as “[a] bedrock principle of tax law.”123 The court then expressly adopted the 
Charlson court’s stance that “[i]f a patent holder exercises control over the recipient 
corporation such that, in effect, there has not been a transfer of all substantial rights 
in the subject patent(s), then the requirements of § 1235 are not met, even if the 
documents describing the transfer formally assign all substantial rights.”124
Next, despite the fact that “mere influence” will not defeat § 1235, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that “effective control” will defeat it because the taxpayer “did not 
effectively transfer all substantial rights to the patent(s).”125 The smoking gun for 
the majority was the corporation’s transfer of patents to Cooper for no 
consideration.126 Because “the right to retrieve ownership . . . is a substantial right,” 
the Ninth Circuit held that “the Tax Court did not clearly err in ruling that Mr. Cooper 
did not transfer ‘all substantial rights’ to the patents.”127
The majority adopted the Tax Court’s findings that Walters and Coulter 
“exercised no independent judgment,” did not “act in their best interests as 
shareholders,” and that decisions about the patents were made by Cooper.128 In light 
of the fact that the corporation returned patents, the Tax Court’s findings supported 
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “there is no reason to think that [Walters and 
Coulter] would have objected to the rescission of any other transfer of patents.”129
b. Dissent
While the majority contended that the correct question was “whether . . . Mr. 
Cooper retained the ability to retrieve the patents at will,” the dissent suggested “that 
[the court] must ask whether, in theory, [the corporation] could have declined to 
transfer the patents back to Mr. Cooper.”130 Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent primarily 
disagreed with the majority’s definition of control.  “The majority err[ed] . . . because 
it dilute[d] the meaning of ‘control’ from the ability to compel a result to something 
less and indeterminate.”131 By diluting the meaning of control, the majority’s 
opinion is “at odds” with the authority it cites, including the Charlson decision and 
the Treasury Regulations on point.132
                                                                                                     
123. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[C]onsiderable legal authority 
supports [the court’s] conclusion that, when determining whether there has been a transfer of all 
substantial rights, we must look beyond the bare form of the transaction.”).
124. Id. at 1092.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1093.
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1092-93.
129. Id. at 1093.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1096 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
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In arguing that Cooper had less control over his patents’ transferee corporation 
than Charlson had, Judge Kleinfeld made the astute observation that in Charlson, the 
taxpayer had power over the four shareholders in the transferee corporation because 
they were his employees and one was his personal attorney.133 “As such, Charlson 
could fire each of them if he disliked how they voted,” and yet, Charlson won his 
case.134 While both Charlson and Cooper’s holding corporations looked to them for 
recommendations and guidance about their patents, the Cooper court viewed the 
arrangement as Cooper exercising control, whereas the Charlson court saw the 
arrangement as mutually beneficial to Charlson and the corporation’s shareholders.
Because “influence is all Cooper had,” the dissent suggested that Cooper’s case is 
more similar to the Lee case.135 In Lee, control was defined as “whether the taxpayer 
can ‘force’ the transferee to do his bidding.”136 There is no evidence in the record 
that Cooper had such force.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Key Difference Between Cooper and Charlson/Lee
The facts of Cooper are similar to the facts in Charlson and Lee in many 
respects.  First, the corporations to which all three inventors transferred their patents 
were created specifically for that purpose.  An indication that the substance of a 
transaction does not match its form is when the transaction lacks a business purpose, 
thereby demonstrating that the taxpayer designed a transaction merely for tax 
avoidance.  Holding corporations are common in the patent world, however, and 
confer non-tax business benefits.  An inventor transferring a patent to a holding 
corporation that was created specifically for receiving the patent is an insufficient 
reason to apply the substance over form doctrine. 
Second, although Charlson was not a shareholder and Cooper and Lee were, all 
of the other shareholders of the transferee corporations were close friends of the 
inventors.  There is no evidence that any of the shareholders had knowledge of the 
patent business, but this was only raised as an issue in Cooper. There, both the Tax 
Court and the Ninth Circuit seemed bothered by the lack of patent experience of 
Walters and Coulter despite their business and professional experiences.  The Cooper 
court was additionally concerned about whether Cooper chose his shareholders so 
that he could control them, especially considering the failure of his previous business 
relationship.  Section 1235 does not place requirements on the nature of an inventor’s 
relationship with the transferee corporation’s shareholders, so long as they are not 
related parties under the provision.  It is logical that Cooper, after a failed business 
relationship, would choose to enter a new endeavor with people he knew and trusted.  
Charlson also chose his friends, and Lee chose his old coworker who invented the 
patent with him.  There is little logic in assuming that Cooper’s interest in working 
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with people he knew somehow equated to his ability to control them. 
Third, the corporations relied on the inventors for their expertise, guidance, and 
knowledge of their patents.  Involving the inventor with decisions about his invention 
is common practice and ideal for the invention, the inventor, and for the holding 
corporation.  The inventor’s knowledge and expertise undoubtedly increase the 
patent’s value, which in turn increases stock value.  Whereas this arrangement was 
viewed as typical and beneficial in Charlson, the Cooper court imputed nefarious 
intent by using the shareholders’ reliance on Cooper’s expertise and guidance as
evidence that he was controlling them. 
The distinction between the cases may be whether the government argued 
substance over form.137 When the Charlson and Lee courts analyzed the issue of 
control, they concluded that the taxpayer inventors were permissibly operating under 
§ 1235; when the Cooper court analyzed similar transactions, however, it concluded 
that the substance over form doctrine mandated a different result.  The Cooper court 
distinguished Cooper from Charlson because the corporation in Charlson “never 
returned patents to the inventor without consideration.”138 However, as discussed 
below, the application of the substance over form doctrine erroneously shifted the 
court’s focus of the § 1235 analysis from the taxpayer to the corporation’s business 
decisions.139 Its conclusion was, therefore, speculative and tainted by the doctrine.
While courts do have a duty to examine the circumstances behind a taxpayer’s 
challenged transactions, the Cooper result suggests that the substance over form 
doctrine has the (perhaps unintentional) effect of acting in a conclusory manner.  In 
other words, after deciding that the substance over form doctrine is applicable to a 
transaction, a court might support the doctrine rather than undertake a neutral 
analysis of the case. 
B. Consequences of the Cooper Decision
The Tax Code has hundreds of provisions.  The Code informs taxpayers of their 
duties and allows them to structure their transactions to their benefit.  Taxpayers pay 
taxes; the Code puts them on notice of the tax consequences of their actions. 
While there will always be room to argue in the gray spaces of the Code, the 
Cooper decision adds unnecessary uncertainty for inventors.140 By erroneously 
applying the substance over form doctrine, the Cooper court redefined the control 
requirement of § 1235.  Congress included § 1235(c) to assuage its concerns about 
inventor control in holding corporations, but the Cooper court seemed to not be 
                                                                                                     
137. Granted, the fact that the corporation gave back some patents does suggest some indicia of 
improper control, but the corporation’s directors may have transferred the patents for many reasons—
perhaps for good business relationship reasons, perhaps because they exercised terrible business 
judgment—but the transfer is not necessarily indicative of effective control by the inventor.  Because it 
could have happened for other reasons, this Author is under the opinion that the taxpayer should have 
received the benefit of the doubt. 
138. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1093 (majority opinion).  The transfer of an asset carries with it its own 
taxation consequences for both the corporation and the individual. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 311 (2012). 
139. See infra Section IV.B.
140. Section 1235 is arguably not very gray. 
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satisfied with Congress’s method.  Because Cooper so clearly met the statute’s 
control requirement, the Cooper court had to wrestle control into another of § 1235’s 
elements.  Although the all substantial rights element is not about control per se, as 
evidenced in its corresponding regulations, the court made it about control for the 
purposes of denying Cooper § 1235’s benefits. 
This misguided focus took the attention away from the inventor and whether he 
retained rights, and instead looked at the corporation and its actions.  It seems that 
the Cooper court made its decision about whether the taxpayer gave away all 
substantial rights by analyzing the transferee corporation’s business decision.141 The 
dissent’s definition of control in the § 1235 context was better: the question is not 
whether a corporation took an action; the question is whether the corporation could 
have refused to take the action.142
Ultimately, the Cooper decision may deter inventors from pursuing § 1235’s tax 
benefits and the incentive to invent, move, and share patents may be lessened.143 For 
rules to work effectively, taxpayers must be able to follow them.  After Cooper,
inventors may be unsure of how to best comply with the requirement regarding 
control.  Although the Code and the regulations lay out the parameters of the 
requirement, Cooper demonstrates that an inventor is not necessarily safe if she 
follows those parameters; rather, she must show no appearance of control as well.  
The easiest way to satisfy this would be to sell her patent to an unknown third party, 
but the Code does not require that.144
Regarding control, § 1235 tells us that the inventor cannot own more than 25% 
of the corporation to which the patents are transferred and that the other shareholders 
cannot be “related parties.”  What do Charlson, Lee, and Cooper add to our 
understanding?  It is acceptable to start a corporation for the purpose of transferring 
your patents, to be a shareholder in that corporation, and to have your closest friends 
and employees as shareholders and corporate directors.  It is also acceptable to advise 
the corporation.  It is not acceptable, however, to do those things if the corporation 
makes a business decision that a court would not have made. 
As Judge Kleinfeld pointed out, “Congress thought it was a good idea to give 
patent holders a tax benefit, but the majority's decision creates so much risk of 
litigation that it may be a bad idea to claim the benefit.”145 Of course, it is not so 
clear after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act whether, or for how long, Congress will 
continue to give patent holders a tax benefit. 
                                                                                                     
141. An exploration of whether this might be a modified form of veil piercing is outside the scope of 
this Note.
142. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1097 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
143. There is evidence that tax incentives may, indeed, affect the incentive to invent. See Ufuk 
Akcigit et al., Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24982, 2018).
144. This might not be the best course of action for the patent’s future, either.
145. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1099 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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C.  Suggestions
1.  Substance over Form Doctrine Should be Applied More Narrowly
Anti-abuse doctrines can be useful and the IRS should have the protection of the 
substance over form doctrine when a taxpayer blatantly disregards the requirements 
of the Code.  The doctrine can no doubt help protect against untoward taxpayer 
schemes.146 The doctrine should not, however, be applied in any circumstance in 
which the government merely does not like the result of a transaction.
The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Commissioner’s substance over form 
argument, interpreted the doctrine as “look[ing] beyond the bare form of the 
transaction.”147 A court should, of course, look beyond the bare form, but the 
doctrine implies something more than a look.  The doctrine implies that if the 
government is applying it, something is amiss.  This is faulty logic because the 
government applies the doctrine when it does not like the result of a taxpayer’s 
transactions, but not liking the result of a transaction does not mean that the 
transaction occurred outside of the legitimate boundaries of the Code.
The First Circuit’s application of the substance over form doctrine is a better 
standard.  Even if the doctrine is argued in a case where the government merely does 
not like the outcome, it will not automatically weigh against the taxpayer if a court 
treats the doctrine as a tool of statutory interpretation.  Cooper may have followed 
Charlson and Lee under this standard.
Moreover, the substance over form doctrine should generally be applied more 
narrowly.  The doctrine should be reserved for those times when a taxpayer truly 
mischaracterized or mislabeled something in search of a benefit to which the 
taxpayer was not entitled.  A taxpayer should not be able to label their dog a cow in 
order to receive cow subsidies.  But the doctrine should not apply if the government 
disagrees with a dog owner receiving cow subsidies after she purchases cows in order 
to receive the subsidies.
Because § 1235’s elements are clearly defined, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where the substance over form doctrine’s application would be necessary to 
defeat a taxpayer’s inappropriate use of the provision.  The statute itself is sufficient 
to strike down the use of § 1235 for a taxpayer who mischaracterizes or mislabels 
his transactions, or otherwise attempts to bamboozle the IRS.  In light of § 1235’s 
clarity, substance over form is an unnecessary doctrine.148
The Code has grown.149 Of the many provisions Congress has added are a 
handful of specific situations in which the IRS is given the express authority to 
                                                                                                     
146. See Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. 7, 78 (2018) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If a kennel and a 
taxpayer agree that a tail is a leg, a taxpayer might say he has a five-legged dog. But unless the Code or 
regulations tell us differently, his dog still has only four legs for tax law.”).
147. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1091 (majority opinion).
148. Because comprehensive Code revisions and additions have replaced piecemeal common law, 
the use of judicially-created doctrines may no longer be appropriate in tax cases at all. See Madison, 
supra note 55, at 716. 
149. During the days of Gregory, the Code fit on 400 pages; it now takes over 36,000. Id. at 745.
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recharacterize transactions using substance over form principles.150 On the one hand, 
the fact that Congress has built substance over form into the Code lends support to 
its use generally.  On the other hand, the fact that Congress has only built it into 
certain provisions and not as an overarching principle applicable to the whole Code 
implies that Congress does not intend for the doctrine to be applied willy-nilly. 
2.  Congress Should Clearly Speak to Inventions and Capital Gains Treatment
Section 1235 was almost repealed.151 By expanding § 1221, the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act specifically excluded the income from the sale or exchange of a patent from 
receiving capital gain treatment under general characterization principles,152 and the 
House’s accompanying repeal of § 1235’s special characterization rule would have 
closed the door to capital gain income for inventors.  Is this what Congress intended?  
In light of the Code’s general pronouncement that self-made goods are not capital 
assets, it would not be nonsensical for Congress to make this change.  If Congress 
intended to close the door to capital gains income for inventors, it needs to remove 
the ambiguity.  One way to make this intention clear is to redefine the definition of 
“holder” in § 1235 to exclude the inventor.153
It makes better sense, however, to encourage invention by offering tax benefits 
to inventors.  “It is widely accepted by economists and nations alike that innovation 
drives economic prosperity.”154 The recent tax bill, however, shows a decisive move 
away from encouraging innovation.  Attempting to stimulate the economy by 
offering tax breaks for tangible machines and manufacturing equipment instead of 
innovation and invention was simply “short-sighted.”155
Of the many ways Congress chose to actively discourage innovation in America, 
it made the above changes to § 1235, eliminated the research and development tax 
deduction, and failed to adopt a patent box.156 Innovation may suffer and/or move 
offshore as a result.157 While the United States has fallen from its position “at the 
forefront of innovation policy,” many other nations are employing strategies to 
increase innovation, including tax incentives to become more competitive.158
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V. CONCLUSION
Cooper was denied capital gain treatment on his patent royalty income despite 
following the Code’s requirements under § 1235.  The overreaching application of 
the substance over form doctrine led the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit to the 
conclusion that Cooper effectively controlled the corporation to which he transferred 
his patents despite satisfying Congress’s control requirement.  
While the substance over form doctrine may have had its use when the Code 
was young, it is now applied too widely and at the expense of taxpayers.  A 
consistent, functional approach is necessary, with a uniform definition of what the 
doctrine is and when it should be applied.  If it is to be used, the substance over form 
doctrine should be reserved for those situations when a taxpayer mischaracterizes or 
mislabels a transaction to receive an illegitimate benefit.  The fact is that the Code 
may bestow benefits on taxpayers that the government does not agree with, but this 
does not mean that the substance over form doctrine should swoop in against the 
taxpayer. 
In the end, taxpayers have a duty to pay taxes, but they do not have a duty to pay 
more than their due.  Taxpayers require clarity in order to know the taxation 
consequences of how they arrange their affairs.  Although Congress needs to resolve 
the Code’s internal inconsistency in its treatment of income from the sale or 
exchange of patents resulting from the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 1235 and its 
elements provide the clarity necessary for an inventor to receive its benefits.  The 
Cooper decision unnecessarily complicates the provision’s requirements. 
When the Code allows taxpayers to structure their transactions to benefit them, 
the Service must accept that reality.  If it is displeased with how a taxpayer follows
the Code, it can issue regulations or wait for Congress to fix the problem.  It should 
not, however, use the courts to take its displeasure out on taxpayers. 
                                                                                                     
“[o]ther nations have responded with smart, well-funded innovation policies like better R&D tax 
incentives, more government funding for research, [and] more funding for technology 
commercialization initiatives.” Michelle Jamrisko & Wei Lu, The U.S. Drops Out of the Top 10 in 
Innovation Rating, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-
22/south-korea-tops-global-innovation-ranking-again-as-u-s-falls.
 
 
 
